Interbanking cybersecurity advisory

Context

• Stakeholders needed an independent view on how interbanking systems should withstand targeted disruption and insider risk.
• Standards and vendor claims had to be translated into operational controls banks could actually run.

Problem

• High-level policy did not yet map to measurable technical and procedural controls across participants.
• Incident response assumptions had not been stress-tested against realistic cross-institution scenarios.

Approach

• Framed scenarios from plausible attack paths rather than generic compliance checklists.
• Aligned recommendations to roles: regulator, operator, and participant institutions.
• Prioritised controls that reduce blast radius and improve detectability over cosmetic certification exercises.

System / architecture

• Reference segmentation for message switching and settlement adjacent systems; identity and key management discipline.
• Backup, recovery, and crisis communication patterns designed for systemic dependencies.

Outcome

• Clearer prioritisation of security investments and a shared vocabulary between policy and engineering stakeholders.
• Improved confidence that tabletop scenarios matched operational reality.

Representative national-scale financial infrastructure advisory; no implication of current or ongoing official relationship.